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In a recent issue of Biolinguistics, Lohndal & Narita (2009, henceforth L&N) reply 
skeptically to my attempt to sketch a theory that takes both internalist and exter-
nalist inquiry seriously (Lassiter 2008). My reply serves two purposes. First, L&N 
seriously misrepresent my work, and a certain amount of correction is needed. In 
particular, they seem to be laboring under the misconception that my proposal was 
intended as an argument against internalism, rather than an argument for a science 
of language that makes use of both internalist and externalist modes of inquiry and 
attempts to relate them systematically. A more important issue, however, is the 
evaluation of L&N’s positive claims. I argue that their highly restrictive vision of the 
methodology of linguistics is dubious in light of the current landscape of the field, 
and potentially harmful to the development of a proper biolinguistics. I identify 
three separate notions of internalism that are lurking in L&N and argue that two of 
them are harmless but relatively uninteresting, while the third is both unmotivated 
and dangerously parochial. I conclude with some speculations about the place of 




Let me begin by emphasizing that, although I focus here on weaknesses in their 
account, I do think L&N make a real contribution to the discussion. In particular, 
they argue that my characterization of internalism is not faithful to Chomsky, and 
they offer an alternative characterization. This may well be right, and I will return to 
the characterization of internalism in section 2. Further, they state a widely held, but 
rarely articulated, set of assumptions with remarkable clarity, and this makes the 
task of evaluating these assumptions easier. With these positive aspects in mind, I 
will proceed here to what I see as flaws in their portrayal of my own position, and 
then to flaws in their own.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
  Many thanks to Dan Johnson, Maryam Bakht, and Txuss Martín for helpful discussion and 
comments on this reply. 
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 There are numerous inaccuracies in L&N’s rendition of Lassiter (2008), indeed 
more than I can respond to in this space. I can only ask the reader, rather than judg-
ing my contribution from L&N’s selective and distorted summary, to refer to the 
original. However, two important points of clarification are in order, without which 
it will be impossible to understand the following discussion. First, L&N claim 
repeatedly that my paper advocates “Dummett-type externalism”—a serious charge 
in some quarters. In fact I expended considerable energy to refute precisely this type 
of externalism, using Dummett as the prototype of an externalist whose theory is 
unworkable (Lassiter 2008: 611-617). The type of ‘externalism’ that I argued for in the 
remainder of the essay has little in common with Dummett except that it takes 
seriously the intuitions on which he bases his theory, rather than dismissing them out 
of hand. My theory was no more ‘Dummett-type’ than any theory whose practition-
ers make use of grammaticality intuitions is ‘Chomsky-type’. 
 Secondly, L&N take my paper as a “criticism of the internalist project” and as 
an attempt to “suggest an alternative to the internalist science of language” (L&N: 
330). This was not even remotely my intention, nor is this reading supported by my 
words (except under a certain extremely narrow definition of ‘internalism’, cf. 
section 2.3 below). It is true that my discussion did not pre-suppose internalism: This 
would have been problematic for my goal of convincing externalist-inclined philoso-
phers that they can coexist with internalists. But I did not argue against internalism 
—far from it, my theory depended crucially on the fact that speakers possess internal 
linguistic representations that play a causal role in their linguistic productions, as I 
repeatedly emphasized.  
 The thrust of the paper was that the obvious difficulties in accommodating 
semantic externalism within linguistics—for example, problems about dialect contin-
ua identified by Chomsky (1986, 2000), and the usual dismissal of mentalism by 
externalists—can be resolved by careful attention to social and sociolinguistic details. 
The negative claim (not original to me) was that there are linguistic facts which can-
not be explained solely by reference to the internal states of individuals; the main 
positive claim was that these same facts can be explained by reference to individuals’ 
internal states and the way that individuals interact with each other. This is obvious-
ly not the same as saying that there are no internalistic facts about language, or that 
internalist inquiry is not an important, indeed crucial, aspect of the study of human 
language. My paper claimed that semantic externalism and internalism are, contrary 
to appearances, compatible and in fact complementary. This is not an argument 
against internalism under any reasonable construal of this term.  
 L&N’s critique consists of at least three strands. One is a rather general defense 
of internalist inquiry which, since I am not an opponent of this methodology, misses 
the mark entirely. The second strand is a handful of specific criticisms of the propo-
sal in Lassiter (2008), which I will not answer in detail because they are either beside 
the point (e.g., criticizing me for not defining ‘accommodation’ when that term is 
clearly defined and discussed in detail in references cited) or they do not seriously 
engage the details of the proposal under evaluation and its philosophical back-
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ground, so that a reply would be little more than a rehash.  
 The third and most important type of criticism L&N raise is a generic indict-
ment of externalist inquiry. Their argument here is interesting, to my mind, even 
though they do not even attempt to engage the large philosophical literature on 
semantic externalism that motivates Lassiter (2008), nor to discuss the specific 
questions work that that paper responds to (e.g., issues in the semantics of names 
and definite descriptions, or detailed questions about how semantic-externalist intu-
itions interact with specific patterns of social interaction). Instead L&N focus on the 
question of whether externalist inquiry in general (N.B.: not just semantic externalism, 
the main concern of Lassiter 2008) is worth pursuing.1 This is a rather blunt-edged 
argument, so it is not clear why they chose my paper, of all the huge body of rele-
vant work in philosophy, linguistics, psychology, anthropology, etc., as a target for 
this criticism. However, their discussion raises a number of interesting questions 
which are worth responding to on their own merit. This is the issue which was 
hinted at in the previous paragraph, and which forms the core of L&N’s paper: What 
is a reasonable construal of internalism, and in what sense is it in conflict with exter-
nalist inquiry?  
 
2. Three Types of Internalism in L&N 
 
2.1. Internalism by Definition 
The first kind of internalism lurking in L&N’s discussion is internalism by definition: 
We simply define ‘language’ as ‘internalist aspects of language’, thus deriving the 
conclusion that externalist aspects are not ‘language’. This idea seems to be present, 
for example, in the following quote: 
 
Lassiter claims that we can overcome such difficulties […] by incorporating 
some sociolinguistic notions into linguistic theory.       (L&N: 321) 
 
Many linguists would have thought that sociolinguistic notions are already present 
in linguistic theory. (As it happens, sociolinguists do not appreciate being told that 
what they do is not ‘linguistics’ or that it is not ‘theory’.) But the terminological 
question is not very interesting to my mind: If someone wants to define the social 
aspect of language use as part of the study of social psychology, for instance, nothing 
particularly interesting hinges on this choice. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
    1 Note that here and throughout I am using the unmodified term ‘externalism’ in the very broad 
sense that L&N do, as a description of inquiry into language use in any fashion. This is not what 
philosophers usually mean by ‘externalism’, and it is not how the term was used in Lassiter 
(2008). The latter notion—which I will call ‘semantic externalism’—picks out a somewhat 
heterogeneous class of claims about the relationship between the meanings of words as an 
individual speaker uses them, and the usage of others with whom she is in contact. (This is 
intentionally vague, since there are many conflicting implementations of this idea which have 
little else in common.) Semantic externalism characterizes only a small part of the wide range of 
inquiry that counts as ‘externalist’ in L&N’s sense. 
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2.2. Internalism as Methodology 
I take it that L&N consider this to be their most important argument for internalism, 
since it contributes the title of their paper. This is puzzling: If the choice to ignore 
externalist aspects of language is simply a methodological one, then there should be 
no difficulty in allowing that other researchers, choosing a different methodology, 
may go about their business, and perhaps even uncover results that complement 
one’s own. Two variants of this position appear in L&N. First: 
 
Chomskyan internalism […] just amounts to “the methodological decision […] to 
study less, prior to studying more”.       (L&N: 329, citing Hinzen 2006: 161) 
 
Can this really be all that internalism amounts to? If so, it is harmless but theoretical-
ly impotent. You decide to study less, hoping to get deeper; I decide to study more, 
hoping to get a broader view. Eventually, we may converge. In any case, it makes no 
sense to argue about which methodology is right. For example, you might study 
cellular biology without taking an interest in the evolutionary history of the relevant 
organism. I might study evolution, either in isolation or along with cellular biology. 
It would be strange indeed for one of us to argue that the other has chosen the 
wrong methodology. 
 On the other hand, “internalism as methodology” might mean this: 
 
We need a more complete understanding of the internal properties of I-language 
before we can even attempt to try to understand how individuals utilize them to 
deal with all sorts of E-language phenomena.          (L&N: 328) 
 
Perhaps. But the claim that L&N are trying to make needs more justification than 
their plea that their own field (syntax, I take it) is not sufficiently well understood. 
First, a good deal has been learned about language use in sociolinguistics and prag-
matics that is independent of the specific grammatical theory employed, undercut-
ting the claim that a complete understanding of I-language must come first. But, 
more to the point, it’s simply not true in general that explanatorily more basic areas 
must be fully understood before profitable research in higher-level fields can be 
undertaken. Darwin did a great deal of extremely important work on evolutionary 
theory without having any idea what the mechanisms of descent with modification 
were. Likewise, no one would seriously argue that all research in ecology should be 
put on hold until every detail of the structure and function of mitochondria is under-
stood. As far as I can see, neither of L&N’s arguments for “internalism as metho-
dology” convey any more than their personal preference for investigating facts that 
can be given an account in strictly internalist terms. This is all well and good, but 
hardly justifies the dismissive attitude toward externalist inquiry that the authors 
display. Something more must be at play. 
 
2.3. “A Truly Scientific Explanation” 
In the end, L&N make only one argument that is genuinely in conflict with the 
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approach outlined in Lassiter (2008): The argument that externalist inquiry, in 
general, cannot be given a scientific basis. Since Lassiter (2008) is an example of 
externalist inquiry, it follows that Lassiter (2008) is not scientific. For instance: 
 
What internalists doubt is rather the feasibility of providing a serious science of 
any mind-external phenomena such as [normativity and communicative success]. 
(L&N: 326) 
 
[G]eneral issues of intentionality, including those of language use, cannot 
reasonably be assumed to fall within naturalistic inquiry.  
(Chomsky 1995: 27, cited by L&N: 326) 
 
[I]nternalists never deny that there are complicated social aspects in the domain 
of language use; they just decide not to let these unexplainable aspects of 
language use enter into their naturalistic theory at the present stage of inquiry. 
(L&N: 330; emphasis added) 
  
These are sweeping claims. If they are correct, a great number of people who take 
themselves to be doing research on human language and related topics have, in 
reality, been wasting their time. One would expect that such claims would be 
accompanied, say, by a thorough discussion of the large body of existing work on 
language use (see below) and an explanation of this dismissal making use of some 
clear-cut criteria for what counts as being ‘scientific’. Instead, L&N make this asser-
tion with virtually no argumentation except for a few references to Chomsky’s philo-
sophical works (Chomsky 1995, 2000), and a footnote quoting a definition of “serious 
science” from McGilvray (2002) with no indication of why it should be accepted, or 
its relevance to the specific issues at hand.  
 Frankly, I have a hard time seeing how this argument can be taken seriously. I 
know of no other discipline where scholars can dismiss each others’ work on purely 
aprioristic grounds and others will accept this move as ‘scientific’. Other examples of 
this habit are Chomsky’s (2000) insistence that a theory of language use is impossible 
because it would have to be a “theory of everything”—never mind that numerous 
well-developed theoretical approaches to language use were already in existence 
when this pronouncement was made—or Narita’s (forthcoming) claim that exter-
nalist inquiry is invalid because it disagrees with Descartes’ notion of free will. To 
put it simply: In a “serious science” you cannot dismiss others’ work because it 
disagrees with your philosophical preconceptions—or at least, you cannot do this 
and expect anyone to listen. Criticism of others’ work will consist in a demonstration 
of some actual problem with it—for example, that it makes incorrect predictions 
about some domain—and not simply the fact that one does not feel comfortable with 
its assumptions. (Of course anyone can feel however they want about anyone else’s 
work; they just can’t expect other scholars to take this seriously as an argument.) 
 Further, L&N’s argument—particularly in the third quote cited above—is 
uncannily similar to what Dawkins (1986) describes as the “argument from personal 
incredulity”. As Dawkins observes: 
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Even if the foremost authority in the world can’t explain some remarkable biolo-
gical phenomenon, this doesn’t mean that it is inexplicable. Plenty of mysteries 
have lasted for centuries and finally yielded to explanation.    (Dawkins 1986: 39) 
 
L&N would do well, I think, to be more cautious about what they describe as 
“unexplainable”. In particular, when evaluating a specific proposal (such as Lassiter 
2008, or any of the references cited below), it is not enough to declare that they find 
the phenomena in question mysterious, or that they have already designated that 
domain as “unexplainable” or “unscientific” and that the proposal is thus wrong. 
This is bad argumentation, and totally unconvincing; it also undermines the preten-
tions of being “scientific” that the authors claim to hold dear. 
 Even worse, there already exists an enormous body of work investigating and 
theorizing about language use and closely related topics. I do not know whether 
L&N are unaware of this work, or if they have some reason to dismiss it; but it is 
irresponsible to make pronouncements like those quoted above without even consi-
dering it. I have in mind: 
 
    • Gricean and Relevance-Theoretic pragmatics (Sperber & Wilson 1986, Grice 
1989, Horn 1989, and much other work) 
    • decision-theoretic and game-theoretic pragmatics (e.g., Parikh 2001, van Rooij 
2003, Benz et al. 2006) 
    • experimental, theoretical, and empirical sociolinguistic work demonstrating 
speakers’ sensitivity to social factors in their language use (e.g. Payne 1980, Le 
Page & Tabouret-Keller 1985, Labov 1994, 2001, Eckert & Rickford 2001) 
    • social-psychological work on accommodation, joint action, and related topics 
(e.g., Giles & Powesland 1975, Giles & Robinson 1990, Clark 1992, 1996) 
    • work on coordination and social norms in philosophy and economics (Lewis 
1969, Skyrms 1996, Bicchieri et al. 1997, Young 1998, Bicchieri 2006) 
    • computational simulations of complex societies, including linguistic communi-
cation (Epstein & Axtell 1996, Skyrms 2004, Epstein 2007) 
 
This list could be much longer, but this should give a sense of how rich, varied, and 
theoretically sophisticated the study of language use already is and promises to 
become in the future.2 (Sadly there is no room here for a detailed discussion of the 
results and prospects of this large body of research; but the works cited speak for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
    2 Truth-conditional semantics has been the target of a certain amount of abuse from internalists, 
and perhaps it belongs here as well. I omit it because I do not think that it is necessarily an 
externalist enterprise. Nor, in my experience, do many of its practitioners, particularly the ones 
who work in linguistics departments. Notions such as truth in a model are essentially mathe-
matical notions which do not care whether they are used for internalist or externalist purposes. 
But if I am wrong, and it is true that semantics is essentially externalist, so much the worse for 
L&N: They now have the burden of explaining for yet another field how so many researchers 
have discovered so many systematic facts and compelling explanations in an area which 
supposedly is not “serious science” or “naturalistic inquiry”. 
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themselves.) It seems strange indeed, in this light, to hold to a speculative notion of 
what is or is not possible in the study of language use. Unless L&N are willing to 
dismiss all of this work as “unscientific”, they will have to reconsider their position. 
Even if they are willing to do this, I see no reason to take such a position seriously, 
unless they can demonstrate point by point that all of this research is misguided. By 
any reasonable definition, it seems to me, there are numerous approaches to the 
study of language use that have claim to the title of “serious science”.  
 
3. The Place of Externalist Inquiry within Biolinguistics 
 
When I began my research into issues about internalism and externalism a few years 
ago, I knew of externalism only through Chomsky’s writings, and I wanted to show 
once and for all that there is no place for semantic externalism in a science of 
language. As I read the classic works in the philosophical literature, however, I 
realized that semantic externalism was less a theory than a bundle of intuitions 
about how people would use words in certain counterfactual situations. Even 
though existing attempts to explain these intuitions were clearly unworkable, it did 
not follow that no such theory could be constructed, or that the general approach 
was useless. The realization that I came to is nicely summarized in an epitaph by 
Langer (1962: ix), quoted by W. Tecumseh Fitch in the same issue of Biolinguistics in 
which L&N’s paper appeared: 
 
The chance that the key ideas of any professional scholar’s work are pure non-
sense is small; much greater the chance that a devastating refutation is based on 
a superficial reading or even a distorted one, subconsciously twisted by a desire 
to refute.                     (Fitch 2009: 286) 
 
Rather than dismissing the ideas of Kripke, Putnam, Dummett, Burge, Lewis, and 
other professional scholars as stupid or useless, I decided to attempt to explain their 
insights in a way that was consistent with my understanding of language, as a lingu-
ist trained in both theoretical (Chomskyan) and socio-historical linguistics. Lassiter 
(2008) was the result. Whatever the value of that specific proposal, I simply do not 
accept that this project is a waste of time in principle, as L&N seem to believe. 
Judging by his inclusion of the above quote, at least one prominent biolinguist 
would agree. 
 Fitch quotes the above passage in a section where he discusses sociological 
barriers to progress in biolinguistics, in particular citing “terminology and differing 
conceptions of ‘language’” as impediments. As the discussion in section 2 suggests, I 
am of the opinion that L&N’s critique of my work, like a great deal of the inter-
nalism–externalism debate more generally, deals more with these sociological issues 
than with genuine theoretical problems. The only real point of contention that I can 
identify is L&N’s insistence (echoing Chomsky) that there can be no scientific theory 
of language use. I am unable to locate a substantive argument for this negative claim 
in L&N or in any of Chomsky’s work; and, if we were to accept it, this would mean 
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dismissing existing efforts to provide just such a theory—within pragmatics and 
sociolinguistics, as well as related work in psychology, anthropology, economics, 
political science, and other disciplines—as “pure nonsense”.  
 It is much better, I think, for internalists—really, I mean biolinguists, of whom 
I consider myself one—to try to integrate their theories with neighboring disciplines, 
and whenever possible to make use of other theories’ insights in our own work. Here 
again Fitch’s discussion of how to make progress in biolinguistics is relevant: 
 
Theoretical discussions are often dominated by rhetorical battles and ideological 
or terminological debate rather than constructive attempts to make tangible 
progress. Much of the criticism that currently divides the  relevant fields boils 
down to “My opponent says we should look to x for answers, but I believe we 
should look to y instead”. Typically, both x and y are probably important. Given 
the large number of open questions, biolinguistics will be better off when 
individual researchers pursue those topics and approaches they believe are 
important and promising, and refrain from attacking others who have different 
interests or try different approaches. There is little to be gained from such 
attacks, and if my experience is any guide, much to be lost.     (Fitch 2009: 291) 
 
I think that both internalist and externalist aspects of language are important, and 
that both will eventually admit of scientific explanation (though probably not in the 
same terms). Anyone who wants to disagree with either my interest or my optimism 
should of course feel free; but it makes no sense to deny others the opportunity to 
look for answers, simply because one personally does not think they will be found. 
In any case, the proof is in the pudding: As we have seen, many scholars have al-
ready developed sophisticated approaches to language use. I suspect that useful and 
predictive theories of language use will continue to develop, as they have already 
been developing for many years, uninhibited by the insistence of certain internalists 
that this simply cannot happen. 
 What would the place of externalist inquiry be within biolinguistics? An 
important tradition in sociolinguistics, associated in particular with the work of Dell 
Hymes (e.g., Hymes 1974), deals with the notion of ‘communicative competence’. 
Hymes suggests that the ability to use language in socially appropriate ways is part 
of individuals’ knowledge of language, broadly construed. A great deal of empirical 
and experimental study in sociolinguistics has confirmed that speakers have detailed 
knowledge, not just of grammatical features of language, but also of how to use 
language appropriately in a social context. Biolinguists who make use of the model of 
Hauser et al. (2002) need not dismiss this notion as “unscientific”—rather, communi-
cative competence can be treated as part of the ‘faculty of language in the broad 
sense’ (FLB), that is, as one of various areas where non-linguistic cognitive skills in-
terface with grammar narrowly construed. Likewise, pragmatics both in the tradition 
of Grice (1989) and the more recent attempts to provide game-theoretic foundations 
for pragmatics (Parikh 2001, Benz et al. 2006) treats language use as the interface 
between purely linguistic knowledge and domain-general social reasoning and 
decision-making abilities. (The latter, by the way, also provides a precise, testable, 
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and mathematically rigorous theory of language use, again contrary to the claim that 
no such theory is possible.)  
 I see no conflict between externalist lines of inquiry like these and internalism, 
beyond the exclusionary attitude of some internalists against those who pursue other 
approaches to language. Rather, they fit naturally within the framework proposed 
by Hauser et al. (2002) as aspects of FLB. My attempt in Lassiter (2008) to articulate a 
notion of ‘social meaning’ was an extension of these aspects of FLB: In particular, I 
focused on word meaning as it related both to grammar (the narrow faculty) and 
pragmatic and communicative competence as social skills. Communicative compe-
tence is an inherently social skill, and so it comes as no surprise that, if two language 
users with identical internal states were embedded in different social environments, 
one might be judged communicatively competent while the other is not. This is 
really all that Burge’s ‘arthritis’ story shows: Our intuitions about what constitutes 
appropriate language use does not depend exclusively on the internal states of 
language users, but also on who they are in communication with and whether their 
present internal states will allow for successful communication. Many philosophers, 
in particular, tend to include such facts in their notion of ‘meaning’, a practice which 
I followed in Lassiter (2008). This may not agree with some linguists’ use, but it is a 
mere terminological issue, and perfectly acceptable usage if flagged appropriately.  
 The notion of social meaning is simply not a challenge to internalist explan-
ations of linguistic competence. The situation is the same as it would be, say, in 
decision theory: The claim that individual agents attempt to make the best possible 
choices given their information and preferences is not threatened by the fact that 
agents sometimes make mistakes due to bad information or processing constraints 
(see Gintis 2009 for discussion of the competence–performance distinction in this 
domain). The distinction between the mechanism and how the mechanism is put to 
use in concrete circumstances is not threatened by the existence of research 
attempting to connect the two. Further, my construal of notions like ‘normativity of 
meaning’, ‘deference’, etc. was an attempt to embed a theory of individual agents’ 
internal states within a social context and derive predictions. L&N and anyone else 
should, of course, feel free to disagree with or ignore this attempt; but it is funda-
mentally opposed to the spirit of scientific inquiry—not to mention bad for the 
future of the science to which this journal is dedicated to cultivating—for L&N to 
trivialize the effort or discourage further investigation simply because it is not what 
they do, or because they personally dislike such efforts.  
 More generally, linguists simply cannot afford to ignore issues of language 
use. Those who do will be deprived of the insights of highly relevant and 
increasingly intricate theories—from the realms of pragmatics, psychology, and 
computational modeling, to name a few—many of which are compatible with, or 
even presuppose, the biolinguistic thesis that language acquisition and structure are 
explained in large part by biological facts about humans. If biolinguists ignore or 
trivialize these efforts on the basis of a priori claims about what kinds of theories are 
possible, I fear that biolinguistics itself will come to be ignored and trivialized as 
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theories of the supposedly impossible type are actually developed. It would be better 
to give up this provincialism and acknowledge that there is no principled conflict 
between biolinguistics and theorizing about language use—in other words, that 
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